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Summary
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, various recommendations and efforts have been made with the intention
of improving information sharing among government entities at all levels within the
United States, the private sector, and certain foreign governments, with a view to
countering terrorists and strengthening homeland security. The National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) was among those to
have most recently offered recommendations in this regard in its July 22, 2004,
report.  The types of information potentially within the scope of such sharing include
raw data, which has undergone little or no assessment regarding its accuracy or
implications; knowledge, which has been determined to have a high degree of
reliability or validity; and intelligence, which has been carefully evaluated concerning
its accuracy and significance, and may sometimes be credited in terms of its source.
This report reviews some of the principal existing homeland security information
sharing arrangements, as well as some projected arrangements in this regard, and
discusses related policy, evaluations, and proposed legislation.  It will be updated as
events warrant.
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Information Sharing for Homeland Security:
A Brief Overview
Among the responses prompted by the terrorists attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon were various recommendations for, and subsequent efforts
at, improving information sharing among government entities at all levels within the
United States, the private sector, and certain foreign governments, with a view to
countering terrorists and strengthening homeland security. The National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) was among those to
have most recently offered recommendations in this regard in its July 22, 2004,
report.  Because the commission’s report arrived at a time when information sharing
improvements were well underway, its recommendations were multifaceted.
9/11 Commission Recommendations
In Chapter 12, titled “What to Do?  A Global Strategy,” the commission’s report
provided two sets of recommendations pertaining to the exchanging or sharing of
information.  With respect to border screening, the panel proffered the following
recommendation:
! The U.S. government cannot meet its own obligations to the
American people to prevent the entry of terrorists without a
major effort to  collaborate with other governments.  We should
do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies,
and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel
and border crossing over the medium and long term through
extensive international cooperation.1
While the commission’s recommendation was not specific as to how such
collaborations could be carried out, the report suggested the need for global standards
for identity authentication (such as biometrically enhanced passports), and stated that
the U.S. should take a leading role in establishing these standards.  One potential
longer-term implication of carrying out this recommendation was a global network
of country-based screening systems that could verify the departure/arrival of an
individual and authenticate that person’s identity in real time.  
While advocating greater information sharing, the report also recognized how
consolidating and transferring large amounts of information about individuals could
be susceptible to abuse.  Regarding the protection of civil liberties, the report called
for an “enhanced system of checks and balances” to be built into the policy
framework used to oversee and regulate information sharing.  To that end, three
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recommendations were included regarding what information would be shared, why
the information would be shared, and who would be overseeing these activities.
! As the President determines the guidelines for information
sharing among government agencies and by those agencies with
the private sector, he should safeguard the privacy of
individuals about whom information is shared.
! The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental
power should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power
actually materially enhances security and (b) that there is
adequate supervision of the executive’s use of the powers to
ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted, there
must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine
its use.
! At this time of increased and consolidated government
authority, there should be a board within the executive branch
to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the
commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties.2
In Chapter 13, titled “How To Do It? A Different Way of Organizing
Government,” the commission’s report included two recommendations that explicitly
addressed the need to facilitate the development of a policy and technical
environment that encouraged and supported information sharing.  With respect to
developing policies that foster a culture of information sharing, the commission
recommended:
! Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing,
to restore a better balance between security and shared
knowledge.3
This commission recommendation highlighted what it considered to be a
significant impediment to comprehensive intelligence analysis — the “‘need-to-
know’ culture of information protection.”4  The commission suggested that, while the
federal government has access to huge volumes of information, procedural and
organizational cultural  barriers undermined the government’s ability to capitalize on
these resources.  The commission also cited two specific factors that have helped to
perpetuate  “need-to-know” information practices.  One was the lack of robust
internal information sharing procedures, which, in turn, contributed to the
compartmentalization of information as a standard practice, rather than the regular
dissemination of information to the external community of users.  According to the
commission, current procedures allowed information to be shared if someone
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other security protocols.  The purpose of such an approach was to guard against the
disclosure of information that could create security risks.  However, the commission
suggested that, if taken too far, such security procedures can outweigh the benefits
that could be gleaned from information sharing.5
A second factor cited by the commission as perpetuating “need-to-know”
information practices was an organizational culture, prevalent across agencies, that
supports disincentives to information sharing.  As the report stated: “There are no
punishments for not sharing information.”6  However, depending upon the situation,
criminal, civil, and/or administrative penalties can be imposed if information is
shared or disclosed in violation of procedure.  The commission suggested that the
emphasis on security had led to the “overclassification and excessive
compartmentalization of information among agencies.”7  Obstructed access to
information can also have both analytical and financial costs, by contributing to
incomplete analysis and the duplication of effort by various agencies. 
To address these concerns, the commission advocated replacing the “need-to-
know” information culture with a “need-to-share” information culture.  In order to
transition to an intelligence information environment that emphasized the “need-to-
share,” development of new procedures must also be matched with the development
of a technical infrastructure that enables actual information sharing.  To that end,
with respect to developing the technical infrastructure for information sharing, the
commission offered the following recommendation:
! The president should lead the government-wide effort to bring
the major national security institutions into the information
revolution.  He should coordinate the resolution of the legal,
policy, and technical issues across agencies to create a ‘trusted
information network.’”8
The report did not specify exactly how a trusted information network would be
constructed, who would use it, or what information would be shared through it.
However, it did highlight some of key features that would characterize the trusted
information network, and cited an example described in a recent Markle Foundation
report as “an outstanding conceptual framework for the kind of ‘trusted information
network.’”9 According to the commission’s report, the trusted information network
would be based on a decentralized network model that would facilitate information
sharing not only within agencies (vertically), but also, more critically, across agencies
(horizontally).  The report also recommended using a digital rights management
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framework, so that a trusted information network could allow agencies to maintain
and populate their own databases, as well as establish access controls to govern the
use of the data by authorized individuals within the network.  The commission also
suggested that presidential leadership would be required to address the policy and
legal issues associated with establishing a trusted information network.  This
leadership, in turn, could develop standards for common information use, and could
be applied across the participant community.  
Another recommendation would have had the President, when determining “the
guidelines for information sharing among government agencies and by those agencies
with the private sector,” also “safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom
information is shared.”  Seeking to reinforce compliance with these guidelines, and
otherwise finding “that there is no office within the government whose job it is to
look across the government at the action we are taking to protect ourselves to ensure
that liberty concerns are appropriately considered” the report recommended the
creation of the civil liberties oversight board.10
On August 27, 2004, President George W. Bush issued two executive orders
responding to some of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.  One of them,
E.O. 13356, prescribed duties for the heads of agencies possessing or acquiring
terrorist information concerning the accessibility, sharing, and analysis of such
information; set requirements for the collection of terrorism information within the
United States; and, among other considerations, established an Information Systems
Council, chaired by a representative of the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) with at least 10 other members representing specified senior officials,
“to plan for and oversee the establishment of an interoperable terrorism information
sharing environment to facilitate automated sharing of terrorism information among
appropriate agencies.”11
The other directive, E.O. 13353, established the President’s Board on
Safeguarding Americans’ Civil Liberties within the Department of Justice.12  Chaired
by the Deputy Attorney General and composed of 19 other senior counsels and
leaders largely from within the intelligence and homeland security communities, the
board had, among its responsibilities, advising the President regarding civil liberties
policy, gathering information and making assessments regarding such policy and its
implementation, making recommendations to the President, referring information
about possible violations of such policy by a federal official or employee for prompt
action, enhancing cooperation and coordination among federal departments and
agencies in implementing such policy, and undertaking other efforts to protect the
civil liberties of the citizenry as directed by the President.  This board was
subsequently replaced by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board mandated
by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which the President signed
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into law on December 17, 2004.13  Implementing many of the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission, this reform legislation is discussed later in this report.
In the paragraphs below, some of the principal existing homeland security
information sharing arrangements are reviewed, as well as some projected
arrangements in this regard; and related policy, Government Accountability Office
(GAO, formerly known as the General Accounting Office) evaluations, and
legislation are discussed.  The types of information potentially within the scope of
such sharing include raw data, which has undergone little or no assessment regarding
its accuracy or implications; knowledge, which has been determined to have a high
degree of reliability or validity; and intelligence, which has been carefully evaluated
concerning its accuracy and significance, and may sometimes be credited in terms of
its source.
Existing Arrangements
While discussions of information sharing frequently focus on how technology
can be used to break down the so-called “stove pipes” that purportedly inhibit
collaboration among government agencies, it is important to recognize that these
initiatives are more than simply information technology projects.  Instead, they
represent a specific component of ongoing efforts to improve the management,
efficiency, and efficacy of government information resources, often associated with
electronic government or e-government.  As such, information sharing initiatives are
characterized by their programmatic elements as well as their technology elements.
Some of the most common categories or types of information being shared through
these initiatives include intelligence, homeland security, law enforcement, and
critical infrastructure information.
Information shared and technology used by these initiatives can vary widely.
However, an overarching purpose of most of these initiatives is to facilitate better
collaboration and information analysis through the use of improved information
technology and the development of common information standards.  Concerns about
coordination and duplication of these initiatives have been raised since there
currently appears to be no centralized inventory of all the information sharing
initiatives being carried out within and between the federal, state, and/or local
levels.14  GAO has reported, however, that efforts to fight terrorism have spurred the
growth of the number of initiatives at all levels of government since the September
11, 2001, attacks.15  Three existing information sharing initiatives are discussed
below to provide general examples of how information sharing is sometimes carried
out.   
Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) and the
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).  In December 2002, JRIES
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began as a pilot project for the sharing of counterterrorism information between local
and state law enforcement and the Department of Defense (DOD).  JRIES was
initiated by the Joint Intelligence Task Force - Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), led
by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).  The initial participants included the New
York Police Department Counterterrorism Bureau (NYPD-CTB) and the California
Department of Justice Anti-Terrorism Information Center (CATIC).  After
assessment of the pilot phase, JRIES became operational in February 2003.  The
number of participants has also grown to include other municipalities, states, and
federal agencies.16  
In February 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the
launch of its Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) initiative, designed to
connect all 50 states, five U.S. territories, and 50 major urban areas with the
Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) at the department.  To accomplish
this goal, DHS adopted  the JRIES infrastructure, expanding both its capabilities and
its community of users beyond its original “law enforcement and intelligence
counterterrorism mission” while leaving the original JRIES system in place.17  In July
2004, DHS announced that it achieved connectivity to all 50 states.18  JRIES/HSIN
is anticipated to include eventually  users such as state homeland security advisers,
state adjutant generals (National Guard), state emergency operations centers, local
emergency services (fire, police, and other first responders), and possibly private
sector actors as well.  A significant focus of the expanded JRIES/HSIN network will
be to prevent terrorist attacks by capitalizing on the existing human and information
resources at the federal, state, and local levels, and enabling the real time
collaboration and exchange of information for improved awareness and quicker
response to threats.19  Some civil liberties organizations have raised concerns
regarding the exchange of information by state and local law enforcement agencies
with DIA, an intelligence agency barred from collecting information domestically.
Concerns also have been raised about the potential collection information regarding
the activities of legitimate political or social organizations, such as anti-war groups.20
JRIES functions as a secure virtual private network (VPN), connecting various
participant data sources using encrypted communications via the Internet.  JRIES
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relies upon commercial, off-the-shelf technology and Web-based software that
enables users to access database and analysis applications, send secure e-mail, send
and receive maps and other graphics, and collaborate in real time online.21
JRIES/HSIN is currently used to exchange so-called sensitive but unclassified (SBU)
information, although DHS plans to upgrade the security of the network to allow for
the exchange of security classified information at the “Secret” level by fall 2004.
These information protections are discussed later in this report.  In the future, DHS
also plans to develop an interface between JRIES and RISSNET (see below), a long-
established nationwide network of criminal databases used by law enforcement
agencies.22
Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Program.  The RISS
Program is an established system of six regional centers that are used to “share
intelligence and coordinate efforts against criminal networks that operate in many
locations across jurisdictional lines.”23  The RISS Program was created to combat
traditional law enforcement targets, such as drug trafficking and violent crime, but
has been expanded to include other activities, such as terrorism and cybercrime.
According to its website, RISS has “member agencies in all 50 states, the District of
Columbia, U.S. territories, Australia, Canada, and England.”24  The RISS program
uses a regional approach, so that each center can tailor/focus its resources on the
specific needs of its area, while still coordinating and sharing information as one
body for national-scope issues.25  
The origins of the RISS Program date to 1974, when the Department of Justice
awarded its first grant to allow police departments in the southern U.S. to
share/exchange information with each other via computers.26  This support helped
create the first of the six regional centers, the Regional Organized Crime Information
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Information Network (RMIN),28 the New England State Police Information Network
(NESPIN),29 the Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center (MOCIC),30 the
Western States Information Network (WSIN),31 and the Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes
Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network (MAGLOCLEN).32  Membership in
each of the centers includes federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, for an
estimated total of “nearly 7,000 law enforcement and criminal justice agencies
representing over 700,000 sworn officers.”33  The RISS Program continues to be
federally funded through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) at the Department
of Justice (DOJ), which also has program management oversight responsibilities.  In
addition, RISS centers are required to be in compliance with Criminal Intelligence
Systems Operating Policies regarding the confidentiality of information collected and
shared.34 Each RISS center provides its member agencies with a range of services,
including:
! Information sharing — primarily through the operation of the
RISS secure intranet (RISSNET) (see below), providing secure
databases and investigative tools.
! Analysis — including the preparation of analytical products,
compilation and analysis of data, and computer forensics analysis.
! Equipment loans — inventories of specialized investigative and
surveillance equipment, including photographic, communications,
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! Confidential funds — following federal and center guidelines,
money that can be used to purchase information, contraband, stolen
property, and other evidentiary items, as well as to pay investigative
expenses for multijurisdictional investigations.
! Training — meetings and conferences for training on information
sharing techniques, anti-terrorism training; and training in
surveillance techniques, equipment use, safety, and analysis
techniques.
! Technical assistance — training and assistance for activities such
as requesting analytical services, and RISSNET installation and
support.35
The centerpiece of the RISS Program’s information sharing activities is its
secure intranet, RISSNET, which is capable of sharing electronically what is termed
“sensitive but unclassified information.”  RISSNET participants can either connect
a single computer to the intranet, or establish a node connection, enabling wider
access through their agency’s network.  RISSNET participants use a virtual private
network (VPN) connection over the Internet to access the RISSNET gateway
firewall, whereupon the user’s identity is authenticated and access is granted to the
secure intranet.  The secure intranet is a dedicated network carried over frame relay
circuits (a guaranteed amount of bandwidth carried over public telephone lines)
connecting the RISS centers to the database resources.  Security is maintained
through the use of encryption, smart cards, and other Internet security protocols.36
This system enables participants to send and receive secure e-mail transmissions with
other RISSNET participants, as well as use secure Web browser sessions to access
data.  RISSNET also provides access to a number of other resources, including:
! RISS center websites — each of the six RISS centers has a website
that provides information on its services and resources, and provides
access to criminal intelligence databases.
! RISSIntel/RISSNET II — electronically linked collection of web-
based criminal intelligence databases with information provided by
member agencies.
! RISSGang — the RISS National Gang Database, a crime-specific
database related to gangs and gang members, including both text
information and images, such as photographs, gang tattoos, and gang
graffiti.
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! RISSLeads  — the RISS Investigative Leads Bulletin Board, a
newsgroup server where participants can post case-related
information for the purpose of generating investigative leads and can
exchange information with other participants.
! RISSSearch — a search engine that identifies and retrieves data
from multiple databases and information sources, including
restricted information sites, sensitive but unclassified sites, and
public Internet sites.
! RISSTraining — electronic resources for anti-terrorism training.
! RISSLinks — a data visualization tool for analyzing and showing
associations among the results from multiple databases.
! RISSLive — an online, real-time communications medium to
facilitate real-time information sharing among participants.37
Another recently developed resource is the RISS Anti-Terrorism Information
Exchange (ATIX).  Initiated in late 2002, RISS ATIX represents an expansion of the
efforts to facilitate communication and information sharing among personnel
responsible for planning and implementing actions to prevent, mitigate, and recover
from terrorist incidents and disasters.  RISS ATIX participants include constituencies
that have not traditionally participated in RISS.  RISS ATIX participants include both
government and private sector actors, who are divided into ATIX communities, based
on their functions.38  According to the RISS ATIX website, some of the ATIX
communities include “state, county, local, tribal, and federal government; law
enforcement; emergency management; disaster relief; utilities; and, among others,
the chemical, transportation, and telecommunication industries.”39  Since becoming
operational, RISS ATIX has been used to facilitate communications for events such
as Hurricane Isabel in September 2003, the G8 Summit at Sea Island, Georgia, in
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June 2004, and both the Republican and Democratic national conventions in summer
2004.40 
RISS ATIX utilizes four primary components to facilitate communication and
information sharing.  These include:
! RISS ATIX Web page — news articles, online resources, and
contact information tailored to the various ATIX communities.
! RISS ATIX bulletin board — a newsgroup server where
participants can post information related to terrorism, disasters, and
homeland security, as well as “page” online participants and send
secure e-mail messages.
! ATIXLive — an online, real-time communications medium to
facilitate real-time information sharing among participants,
including the “paging” function and the ability to send secure e-mail
messages from within the ATIXLive application.
! ATIX secure e-mail — a secure e-mail application to send and
receive homeland security alerts and exchange information with
other participants.41
On September 1, 2002, RISSNET interconnected with the FBI Law
Enforcement Online (LEO) system to create a so-called “virtual single system” for
the purpose of exchanging sensitive but unclassified homeland security information.
Both RISSNET and LEO participants can access these resources combined using a
single logon identifier.  Participants can also exchange secure e-mail messages.
RISSNET has established, or is in the process of establishing, interconnections with
other information sharing networks as well, including the National Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System (NLETS), the Criminal Information Sharing Alliance
(CISAnet), and the Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX)
Pilot Project.42  As with other information sharing initiatives, civil liberties
organizations have raised concerns about privacy and the potential misuse of personal
data as more information sources become interconnected and available to a larger
number of users.
CRS-12
43 Brian Bergstein, “Database Firm Tagged 120,000 Terrorism ‘Suspects’ for Feds,” (Biloxi,
MS) SunHerald, May 20, 2004, available at [http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/
business/technology/8715327.htm].
44 The FDLE website is available at [http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/].
45 The IIR website is available at [http://www.iir.com/].
46 See [http://www.matrix-at.org/roles.htm].
47 John Schwartz, “Privacy Fears Erode Support for a Network to Fight Crime,”  New York
Times, Mar. 15, 2004, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/15/technology/
15matrix.html]; see also [http://www.matrix-at.org/faq.htm].
48 For a more detailed description of FACTS, see [http://www.matrix-at.org/FACTS_
defined.htm].
49 Ibid.
Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) Pilot
Information Sharing Project.  The MATRIX project was initially developed in
the days following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by Seisint, a Florida-
based information products company, in an effort to facilitate collaborative
information sharing and factual data analysis.  At the outset of the project, MATRIX
included a component Seisint called the High Terrorist Factor (HTF), which was
designed to identify individuals with high HTF scores, or so-called terrorism
quotients, based on  an analysis of demographic and behavioral data.  Although the
HTF scoring system appeared to attract the interest of officials, this feature was
reportedly dropped from MATRIX because it relied on intelligence data not normally
available to the law enforcement community and because of concerns about privacy
abuses.43
In its current form, the MATRIX pilot project is administered through a
collaborative effort between Seisint, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
(FDLE),44 and the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR), a “Florida-based
nonprofit research and training organization, [that] specializes in law enforcement,
juvenile justice, and criminal justice issues.”45  FDLE serves as the “security agent”
for MATRIX, administering control over which agencies and individuals have access
to the system.   FDLE is also a participant state in MATRIX.  IIR is responsible for
administrative support, and is the grantee for federal funds received for MATRIX.46
Thus far, it has been reported that the MATRIX pilot project has received a total of
$12 million in federal funding — $8 million from the Office of Domestic
Preparedness (ODP) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and $4 million
from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) at the Department of Justice (DOJ).47
The analytical core of the MATRIX pilot project is an application called Factual
Analysis Criminal Threat Solution (FACTS), described as a “technological,
investigative tool allowing query-based searches of available state and public records
in the data reference repository.”48  The FACTS application allows an authorized user
to search “dynamically combined records from disparate datasets” based on partial
information, and will “assemble” the results.49  The data reference repository used
with FACTS represents the amalgamation of over 3.9 billion public records collected
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from thousands of sources.50  The data contained in FACTS include FAA pilot
license and aircraft ownership records, property ownership records, information on
vessels registered with the Coast Guard, state sexual offender lists, federal terrorist
watch lists, corporation filings, Uniform Commercial Code filings, bankruptcy
filings, state-issued professional license records, criminal history information,
department of corrections information and photo images, driver’s license information
and photo images, motor vehicle registration information, and information from
commercial sources that “are generally available to the public or legally permissible
under federal law.”51 
The data reference repository is said to exclude data such as telemarketing call
lists; direct mail mailing lists; airline reservations or travel records, frequent
flyer/hotel stay program membership information or activity; magazine subscription
records; information about purchases made at retailers or over the Internet; telephone
calling logs or records; credit or debit card numbers; mortgage or car payment
information; bank account numbers or balance information; records of birth
certificates, marriage licenses, and divorce decrees; and utility bill payment
information.  Participating law enforcement agencies utilize this information sharing
and data mining resource over the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS)
secure intranet (RISSNET), described above.  
Some civil liberties organizations have raised concerns about law enforcement
actions being taken based on algorithms and analytical criteria developed by a private
corporation — in this case, Seisint — without any public or legislative input.52
Questions have also been raised about the level of involvement of the federal
government, particularly the Department of Homeland Security and the Department
of Justice, in a project that is ostensibly focused on supporting state-based
information sharing.53
The MATRIX pilot project has suffered some setbacks in recruiting states  to
participate.  The lack of participation can be especially troubling for a networked
information sharing project such as MATRIX because, as Metcalfe’s Law suggests,
“the power of the network increases exponentially by the number of computers
connected to it.”54  While as many as 16 states have been reported to have either
participated or seriously considered participating in MATRIX at its outset, several
have chosen to withdraw, leaving a current total of five states, including Florida,
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, actively participating.  State
officials have cited a variety of reasons for not participating in MATRIX, including
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costs, concerns about violating state privacy laws, and duplication of existing
resources.55
To help address the privacy concerns associated with a centralized data
repository, some officials have suggested switching to a distributed approach
whereby each state would maintain possession of its data and control access
according to its individual laws.  As a pilot project, MATRIX is expected to continue
through November 2004.  At that time, IIR will submit a final report to officials
evaluating the long-term viability of the project.56
Projected Arrangements
At this time it is unclear if and how the 9/11 Commission report
recommendations regarding information sharing might be implemented.  One option
would be to use and/or modify existing information sharing initiatives, including the
possibility of combining features from existing initiatives.  Another option might be
to build a new information sharing infrastructure from the ground up.  However, in
light of the level of resources already invested in existing information sharing
initiatives, the cost and time involved to build a new infrastructure, and the urgency
that some place on implementing some of the recommendations quickly, it appears
that a comprehensive information sharing initiative would most likely involve
capitalizing on existing resources and working to improve the interoperability of
these resources.  
As described above, some information sharing networks already exist, although
they each have their own specific purposes and goals.  One option might be to
construct a network of networks that incorporates existing information sharing
networks and other databases and resources that could create the trusted information
network called for in the 9/11 Commission report.  In keeping with the
recommendation of the second report of the Markle Foundation’s  Task Force on
National Security in the Information Age, which was cited by the 9/11 Commission
report, such a network would not utilize either a mainframe or a hub-and-spoke
model of information dissemination, both of which feature centralized points for
information flows.57  Instead, the trusted information network could operate as a
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decentralized peer-to-peer network.  This approach would allow participants to retain
control over their respective data, while also reducing the vulnerability of the
information sharing network to attack or failure by not having a single control point
or hub upon which the rest of the system would be dependent.  Through the use of
middleware — software used to connect or integrate two or more separate
applications — the challenges of making diverse databases interoperable, or
compatible, might be addressed.  Middleware could also be designed to support a
rule-based system that could govern which data could be accessed, who could access
the data, and how the data could be used.  A rule-based system could incorporate the
overarching policy framework recommended by the 9/11 Commission report, as well
as jurisdiction-specific privacy and security requirements.  
In light of the emphasis being placed on information sharing, and the complexity
of the issue,  it is likely that the creation of a trusted information network is likely to
require the dedicated attention of key individuals over an extended period of time.
From a technology management perspective, a chief information sharing officer
could be designated within OMB, as well as at each of the relevant agencies.  These
individuals could serve as the primary points of contact for information sharing
initiatives, and could be responsible for working with their respective chief
information officers and agency managers to facilitate compliance with standard
setting and information sharing requirements.  The institutionalization of a chief
information sharing position to champion information sharing might also help ensure
that agencies do not eventually revert to their previous practices.
Related Policy
The development of information sharing for homeland security purposes, as the
above discussion of some of the existing arrangements suggests, occurs within an
existing policy context, which may prove to be in need of clarification, adjustment,
and supplement.   For example, state privacy laws, as noted, apparently have limited
participation in the MATRIX pilot project.  Some federal policy considerations that
bear on information sharing are discussed in this section relative to anticipated
presidential procedures mandated by the Homeland Security Act.
Presidential Procedures.  Signed into law on November 25, 2002, the
Homeland Security Act, establishing the principal homeland security institutions of
the federal government, contains various provisions facilitating or mandating
homeland security information sharing.  Primary among these is Section 892 of the
statute, which defines “homeland security information” as “any information
possessed by a Federal, State, or local agency that (A) relates to the threat of terrorist
activity; (B) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; (C)
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would improve the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist
organization; and (D) would improve the response to a terrorist act.”58
Prior to this definition of homeland security information, five subsections
establish procedures and conditions regarding such information.  The first of these
requires the President to 
prescribe and implement procedures under which relevant Federal agencies (A)
share relevant and appropriate homeland security information with other Federal
agencies, including the Department [of Homeland Security] and appropriate State
and local personnel; (B) identify and safeguard homeland security information
that is sensitive but unclassified; and (C) to the extent such information is in
classified form, determine whether, how, and to what extent to remove classified
information [from its protected status], as appropriate, and with which such
personnel it may be shared after such information is removed.59
 Neither this section nor the other provisions of the Homeland Security Act
define what constitutes “sensitive but unclassified” homeland security information.
The remaining portions of the subsection require the President to “ensure that such
procedures [as he prescribes] apply to all agencies of the Federal Government”;
stipulate that these new procedures “shall not change the substantive requirements
for the classification and safeguarding of classified information”; and specify that the
new procedures “shall not change the requirements and authorities to protect
[intelligence] sources and methods.”
The second subsection prescribes refinements to the procedures established by
the President pursuant to the first subsection.  “Under [the] procedures prescribed by
the President,” it is stated, “all appropriate agencies, including the intelligence
community, shall, through information sharing systems, share homeland security
information with Federal agencies and appropriate State and local personnel to the
extent such information may be shared, as determined in accordance with” the
President’s procedures, “together with assessments of the credibility of such
information.”  Each of these information sharing systems must 
(A) have the capability to transmit unclassified or classified information, though
the procedures and recipients for each capability may differ; (B) have the
capacity to restrict delivery of information to specified subgroups by geographic
location, type of organization, position of a recipient within an organization, or
a recipient’s need to know such information; (C) be configured to allow the
efficient and effective sharing of information; and (D) be accessible to
appropriate State and local personnel.
Other provisions require the establishment of conditions on the use of shared
information “(A) to limit the redissemination of such information to ensure that such
information is not used for an unauthorized purpose; (B) to ensure the security and
confidentiality of such information; (C) to protect the constitutional and statutory
right of any individuals who are subjects of such information; and (D) to provide data
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integrity through the timely removal and destruction of obsolete or erroneous names
and information.”  The information sharing systems are to “include existing
information sharing systems, including, but not limited to, the National Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System, the Regional Information Sharing
System, and the Terrorist Threat Warning System of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation .”  Federal agencies having access to information sharing systems have
access to all of the information shared in those systems.  The prescribed procedures
are to “ensure that appropriate State and local personnel are authorized to use such
information sharing systems (A) to access information shared  with such personnel;
and (B) to share, with others who have access to such information sharing systems,
the homeland security information of their own jurisdictions, which shall be marked
appropriately as pertaining to potential terrorist activity.”  Regarding this shared state
and local information, it is to be reviewed and assessed, under procedures prescribed
jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Attorney General, by
each appropriate federal agency, as determined by the President, and integrated with
existing intelligence.60
The third subsection authorizes the President to “prescribe procedures under
which Federal agencies may, to the extent the President considers necessary, share
with appropriate State and local personnel homeland security information that
remains classified or otherwise protected” after being reviewed for removal from its
protected status.  To facilitate such sharing, a sense of Congress provision recognizes
the use of background investigations and security clearances, non-disclosure
agreements regarding sensitive but unclassified information, and “information-
sharing partnerships that include appropriate State and local personnel, such as the
Joint Terrorism Task Forces of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Anti-
Terrorism Task Forces of the Department of Justice, and regional Terrorism Early
Warning Groups.”
The fourth subsection specifies that the head of each affected agency shall
designate an official having administrative responsibility for that agency’s
compliance with the information sharing requirements of Sections 891-899.61
Finally, the fifth subsection states: “Under procedures prescribed under this
section, information obtained by a State or local government from a Federal agency
under this section shall remain under the control of the Federal agency, and a State
or local law authorizing or requiring such a government to disclose information shall
not apply to such information.”  Presumably, it is the President who prescribes the
referred to procedures; information shared with a subnational jurisdiction pursuant
to these procedures remains under the “control” of the providing federal agency; and,
because the information is under federal “control,” it is beyond the scope of state
information access or freedom of information laws.
On July 29, 2003, President Bush issued E.O. 13311, assigning responsibility
for preparing the Section 892 homeland security information sharing procedures to
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the Secretary of Homeland Security.62  Others, in accordance with the provisions of
the order, will make input, as well, including the Attorney General, the DCI, and
specified officials with whom Homeland Security Secretary Ridge is to coordinate.
How that set of procedures will be formulated has not been made publicly known by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  While many observers expected that
these procedures would be issued during the summer of 2004, they have not appeared
to date.
Control.  Arising with the formulation of the President’s procedures is the
important consideration of the “ownership” or control of shared information.  For the
information sharing procedures mandated by Section 892 of the Homeland Security
Act, Congress has determined in Subsection 892(e) that “information obtained by a
State or local government from a Federal agency under this section shall remain
under the control of the Federal agency.”  The subsection further specifies that such
shared federal agency information is not subject to “a State or local law authorizing
or requiring such a government to disclose information.”
The statute is silent regarding any reciprocal “controls” which state or local
governments may exercise regarding information they provide through the sharing
system.  Whether such information as state or local governments do provide would
constitute, as a threshold question, a federal “agency record” accessible under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is not immediately clear.  The Supreme Court,
because the FOIA provides no definition of an “agency record,” established, several
years ago, in DOJ v. Tax Analysts, a two-prong test for determining whether
materials so qualify.  First, a federal agency must “either create or obtain” the
materials, and, second, “must be in control of the requested materials at the time the
FOIA request is made,” control meaning “that the materials have come into the
agency’s possession in the legitimate conduct of its official duties.”63  Would federal
agencies be considered to have “obtained” state or local government information
voluntarily provided through the sharing system?  Does the voluntary provision of
such information through the sharing system result in its coming under federal
agency “control,” that is “the agency’s possession in the legitimate conduct of its
official duties?”
It seems likely that, if a court is asked to determine whether state or local
government information voluntarily provided through the sharing system falls within
the scope of the FOIA, it would examine the extent to which a federal agency or
agencies had control over the materials at issue.  Beyond this threshold question,
should a court consider whether such information is subject to FOIA, it is a matter
of the applicability of the statute’s nine exemptions to the rule of disclosure and other
provisions protecting law enforcement information.64
Protections.  The President’s procedures for sharing homeland security
information must accommodate various kinds of protected information.  Section
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892(a) of the Homeland Security Act requires the President to “identify and
safeguard homeland security information that is sensitive but unclassified; and ... to
the extent such information is in classified form, determine whether, how, and to
what extent to remove classified information, as appropriate, and with which such
personnel it may be shared after such information is removed.”  Moreover, the new
procedures “shall not change the substantive requirements for the classification and
safeguarding of classified information” and “shall not change the requirements and
authorities to protect [intelligence] sources and methods.”  Following Subsection
892(a), the President is directed, when prescribing the mandated information sharing
procedures, “to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of any individuals who
are subjects of such information.”65  Among the types of protected information so
identified are those which are “sensitive but unclassified,” those which are classified,
and those which may enjoy privacy protection, as well as intelligence sources and
methods.
There is a degree of uncertainty about the meaning and scope of some of these
terms, however, and management requirements for a couple of types of protected
information proffer compliance difficulties for subnational governments.  As
mentioned earlier, neither Section 892 nor the other provisions of the Homeland
Security Act define what constitutes “sensitive but unclassified” homeland security
information.  Some have noted that the Computer Security Act of 1987 refers to, and
defines, “sensitive information,” but neither this statute nor its definition of “sensitive
information” is referenced by the Homeland Security Act regarding “sensitive but
unclassified” information.66  Furthermore, the Computer Security Act, as originally
enacted, specified that it was not to be construed to constitute authority to withhold
information sought pursuant to the FOIA or to authorize any federal agency to limit,
restrict, regulate, or control, among other actions, the disclosure, use, transfer, or sale
of any information disclosable under the FOIA or public domain information.67
Elsewhere, in Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002, allowance is made
for the modification or waiver of a required privacy impact assessment “for security
reasons, or to protect classified, sensitive, or private information contained in an
assessment.”68  What constitutes “sensitive” information for this section is not
evident, because the term is neither defined in the statute nor is its relationship, if
any, to the “sensitive but unclassified” information of Section 892 of the Homeland
Security Act explained.
An internal DHS management directive on “Safeguarding Sensitive But
Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information,” issued on May 11, 2004, indicates
that the “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) marking “will be used to identify sensitive
but unclassified information within the DHS community that is not otherwise
specifically described and governed by statute or regulation.”  Examples of several
types of information treated as FOUO information are provided, such as information
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that may be protectable under the FOIA’s exemptions to the rule of disclosure;
international and domestic information protected by statute, treaty, or other
agreements; “[i]nformation that could be sold for profit”; “[i]nformation that could
result in physical risk to personnel”; and information revealing security
vulnerabilities or breaching operations security.  Access to FOUO information is on
a need-to-know basis, and persons having such access must sign a nondisclosure
agreement.  Secure storage of FOUO information is required, and secure
communication of it by encrypted telephone or fax is encouraged.69
While statutorily undefined, the “sensitive but unclassified” homeland security
information concept perhaps may be discerned in a practice disclosed in regard to the
operations of a new facility, a $4 million expansion of the Upstate New York
Regional Intelligence Center, jointly operated by New York State and the FBI.
Managers explained that security classified information, including data about
individuals, would be “filtered” through screeners and intelligence analysts at the
center so that no classified information would be provided to local authorities.  Thus,
it appeared that details which merited security classification would be eliminated or
obscured, resulting in unclassified information which would still not be available to
the public.70  This unclassified information will probably be regarded as having been
compiled for law enforcement purposes and, as such, protected from disclosure under
the FOIA or comparable New York law.  It seems unlikely, however, that “sensitive
but unclassified” homeland security information, per se, could be protected  from
disclosure pursuant to the FOIA because it does not appear to fall clearly within any
of that statute’s exemptions.
Classified information is understood to be information “specifically authorized
under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy,” and which is “in fact properly classified pursuant
to such Executive order.”71  The operative executive order prescribing security
classification (and declassification) policy and practice is E.O. 12958 of April 17,
1995, as amended by E.O. 13292 of March 25, 2003.72  The latter directive added two
new concerns to the former’s rather traditional, but specific, military, intelligence,
foreign affairs, and national security classification categories: defense against
transnational terrorism and the vulnerabilities of infrastructures, both of which are
probably regarded generally to be homeland security interests.  Security classification
is used to protect Restricted Data, as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and
intelligence sources and methods, the sanctity of which is a statutorily specified
responsibility of the DCI.73  Other types of information protected by security
classification include National Security Agency signals intelligence and
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communications security information, and so-called foreign government information,
which is information provided by a foreign government or international organization
of governments, with the expectation that the information, its source, or both, are to
be held in confidence.
Two types of privileged homeland security information not regarded to be
security classified information, but which may be considered to be “sensitive but
unclassified,” although the DHS management directive on FOUO information
suggests otherwise, are “critical infrastructure information,” as understood within the
context of Subtitle B of Title II of the Homeland Security Act, and “Sensitive
Security Information” (SSI), as that term is defined by the Transportation Security
Administration.  In defining “critical infrastructure information” in Subtitle B of Title
II of the Homeland Security Act, the statute recognizes that this information is “not
customarily in the public domain.”  When voluntarily shared with DHS by the private
sector, it becomes subject to certain protections, including exemption from disclosure
under the FOIA and specified use limitations (sharing with state or local governments
is anticipated).  Federal officers or employees improperly disclosing such critical
infrastructure information may be criminally punished.74  Operative security
classification policy does not authorize the classification of this information, which
remains the private property of the submitter.75
Relying upon information protection provisions of the Air Transportation
Security Act of 1974 and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, the
Transportation Security Administration, now a component of DHS, has issued
transportation security regulations making reference to “Sensitive Security
Information” (SSI), defined as “information about security programs, vulnerability
assessments, technical specifications of certain screening equipment and objects used
to test screening equipment, and other information.”76  A more detailed explanation
of SSI may be found in the regulations.77  While SSI is a type of protected
information, it is not security classified, but may constitute “sensitive but
unclassified” homeland security information.  A federal appellate court ruled in 1993
that 1990 amendments did not by implication repeal the authority of the Air
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Transportation Security Act of 1974 to promulgate and withhold from the public
security-sensitive rules and other related information now within the scope of SSI.78
Speaking at the summer meeting of the National Governors Association in 2003,
Secretary  Ridge indicated that, in addition to the governors, five senior officials in
each state would be given a Top Secret security clearance in order that security
classified information might be shared with them for homeland security purposes.79
Presumably, the states paid for the background investigations for these clearances,
each costing upwards of $2,500, and perhaps used discretionary federal homeland
security grant funds for this expense.  Whether this number of clearances is adequate
for each state, given population, geography, and other differences, is uncertain.  How
these state officials will be able to use classified information to direct the actions of
other uncleared state personnel is somewhat problematic, as are integrity
considerations of detecting and addressing security breaches involving classified
information.
Quality.  Finally, for policymakers, Section 892 seems to require some
attention to data quality in the homeland security information sharing procedures to
be prescribed by the President.  Shared information is to be provided “together with
assessments of the credibility of such information.”  Presumably, these assessments
would be made by the information provider.  Potentially more controversial is the
requirement that shared state and local information “be reviewed and assessed, under
procedures prescribed jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney
General, by each appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the President, and
integrated with existing intelligence.”  The nature of this assessment is left to
determination by the named principals.  The section would also have the President’s
information sharing procedures “provide data integrity through the timely removal
and destruction of obsolete or erroneous names and information,” a rather broad and
highly discretionary standard.  Who would function as the shared information system
manager regarding this data integrity responsibility is not clear, nor is the extent to
which other federal records management law, such as Chapters 31 and 33 of Title 44,
United States Code, is applicable.
GAO Evaluations
In September 2003 testimony before two subcommittees of the House Select
Committee on Homeland Security, Robert F. Dacey, Director of Information Security
Issues for GAO, discussed, among other information sharing matters, the federal
government’s critical information protection (CIP) effort, “which is focused on the
sharing of information on incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities, and the providing of
warnings related to critical infrastructures both within the federal government and
between the federal government and state and local governments and the private
sector.”  Acknowledging that “improvements have been made,” further efforts were
thought to be needed to address the following critical CIP challenges:
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! developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to
facilitate CIP information sharing that clearly delineates the roles
and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal CIP entities, defines
interim objectives and milestones, sets timeframes for achieving
objectives, and establishes performance measures;
! developing fully productive information sharing relationships
within the federal government and between the federal government
and state and local governments and the private sector;
! improving the federal government’s capabilities to analyze incident,
threat, and vulnerability information obtained from numerous
sources and share appropriate, timely, useful warnings and other
information concerning both cyber and physical threats to federal
entities, state and local governments, and the private sector; and
! providing appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to increase
information sharing with the federal government and enhance other
CIP efforts.80
Recounting various recent CIP developments, Dacey noted the 1998 issuance
of Presidential Decision Directive 63, which “established CIP as a national goal and
described a strategy for  cooperative efforts by government and the private sector to
protect the physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of
the economy and the government,” as well as “organizations to provide central
coordination and support.”  Critical infrastructure sectors essential to national
security, national economic security, and/or national public health and safety were
identified.  “For these sectors, which now total 14, federal government leads (sector
liaisons) and private-sector leads (sector coordinators) were to work with each other
to address problems related to CIP for their sector” through the development and
implementation of vulnerability and education programs and a sectoral preparation
plan assessing sector vulnerabilities to cyber or physical attack, as well as ways to
eliminate significant vulnerabilities, and identify, prevent, respond to, and recover
from attacks.  The “voluntary creation of information sharing and analysis centers
(ISACs) to serve as mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, and appropriately
sanitizing and disseminating information to and from infrastructure sectors and the
federal government” was encouraged.  Dacey identified 15 established ISACs and a
prospective center in the maritime transportation sector.81
“An underlying issue in the implementation of CIP,” according to the GAO
testimony, “is that no national plan to facilitate information sharing yet exists that
clearly delineates the roles and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal CIP entities,
defines interim objectives and milestones, sets time frames for achieving objectives,
and establishes performance measures.”  Such a plan, which GAO, since 1998, has
called for and “made numerous related recommendations regarding,” would appear
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to be outside of the scope of the homeland security information sharing procedures
mandated by Section 892 of the Homeland Security Act (although the creation of the
procedures seemingly would benefit from having such a plan).  The plan is, however,
anticipated in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, which indicates that its
creation will build on “baseline physical and cyber infrastructure protection plans”
then under development and subsequently produced in February 2003 as the National
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets and
the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.82  The President’s November 2002 DHS
reorganization plan tasks the department’s Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure
Protection with developing “a national plan for securing the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States,” and specifies certain systems to be included in
such a plan.83
Six months later, in a reprise, Dacey appeared before the same subcommittees
of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security to discuss the status of ISACs.
Operative CIP policy “left the actual design and function of the ISACs to the entities
that formed them,” he explained.  “As a result, although their overall missions are
similar, the current ISACs were established and developed based on the unique
characteristics and needs of their individual sectors.  They operate under different
management and operational structures,” he continued, “and, among other things,
have different business models and funding mechanisms.”  While “most are managed
or operated as private entities,” some “are part of associations that represent their
sectors” and others “have partnered with government agencies.”  The “funding
mechanisms used by the ISACs include fee-for-service, association sponsorship,
federal grants, and/or voluntary or in-kind operations by ISAC participants.”84
Dacey proffered examples of the various methods being used by ISACs to share
information  with their members, other ISACs, and the federal government.  These
methods include:
! Member access to electronic information via email and websites;
! Secure members-only access to information on the ISAC website;
! Conference calls for members; and




Infrastructure Warning Information Network,” which provides continuous, around-the-clock
alert and notification capability to government and industry participants.
86  Ibid., pp. 23, 24-26.
Eleven of the 15 existing ISACs have “created an ISAC Council to work on
various operational, process, and other common issues to effectively analyze and
disseminate information and, where possible, to leverage the work of the entire ISAC
community,” Dacey reported.  He also provided examples of actions taken by DHS
and other agencies to promote and support ISACs, organize critical infrastructure
sectors, and foster information sharing through the ISACs.86
In a July 2004 followup report to the leaders of the two subcommittees of the
House Select Committee on Homeland Security to whom testimony had been given
earlier, GAO identified actions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
ISACs could take to improve the effectiveness of CIP information sharing efforts.
Among the more significant challenges identified were the following.
! Government agencies and the ISACs need to build trusted
relationships between them to facilitate information sharing.  In
some cases, establishing such relationships may be difficult because
sector-specific agencies may also have a regulatory role.
! The federal government and the private sector should share
information on incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities.  Most ISACs
reported that they believed they were providing appropriate
information to the government but, while noting improvements,
they still had concerns with the information being provided to them
by DHS and/or their sector-specific agencies.  These concerns
included the limited quantity of information and the need for more
specific, timely, and actionable information.  In its recent white
papers, the ISAC Council also has identified a number of potential
barriers to information sharing between the private sector and the
government.  These included the sensitivity of the information
(such as law enforcement information), legal limits on disclosure
(such as Privacy Act limitations on disclosure of personally
identifiable information), and contractual and business limits on
how and when information is disclosed (e.g., the Financial Services
ISAC does not allow any governmental or law enforcement access
to its database).  The Council also emphasized that perhaps the
greatest barriers to information sharing stem from practical and
business considerations in that, although important, the benefits of
sharing information are often difficult to discern, while the risks
and costs of sharing are direct and foreseeable.
! The roles of the various government and private-sector entities
involved in protecting critical infrastructures must continue to be
identified and defined.  In particular, officials for several ISACs
wanted a better definition of DHS’s role with respect to them.  The
ISAC Council also identified the need for DHS to establish the
goals of its directorates and the relationship of these directorates
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with the private sector.  The Council also wants clarification of the
roles of the other federal agencies, state agencies, and other entities
 — such as the National Infrastructure Advisory Council.
! Government funding is needed.  Ten of the ISACs we contacted
emphasized the importance of government funding for purposes
including creating the ISAC, supporting operations, increasing
membership, developing metrics, and providing for additional
capabilities.
! Private-sector analytical efforts should not be overlooked and must
be integrated into the federal processes for a more complete
understanding.  The private sector understands its processes, assets,
and operations best and can be relied upon to provide the required
private-sector subject matter expertise.87
Acknowledging that “DHS has taken a number of actions to implement the
public/private partnership called for by federal CIP policy,” GAO, nonetheless,
concluded:
DHS has not yet developed a plan for how it will carry out its information
sharing responsibilities, including efforts to address the challenges identified by
the ISACs and the ISAC Council.  In addition, DHS has not developed internal
policies and procedures to help ensure effective information sharing by the many
entities within the department that collect and analyze information that may
impact the security of our nation’s critical infrastructure.  It is essential for DHS
to develop this plan, along with internal policies and procedures, to establish
effective information-sharing relationships both within DHS and with other
federal agencies and infrastructure sectors.88
Legislative Considerations
It appears that there are at least two possible legislative approaches to create a
policy framework for a trusted information network for sharing counterterrorism and
related information among federal, state, and local governments, as well as selected
portions of the private sector.  One strategy might be to amend the Homeland
Security Act with such a framework.  Another strategy might be to amend Chapter
35 of Title 44, United States Code,  captioned “Coordination of Federal Information
Policy.”  Located in this chapter are such information life cycle management laws as
the Paperwork Reduction Act and the Federal Information Security Management Act,
which was enacted as Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002.89
Each strategy has implications for the designation of a principal manager of the
resulting policy framework for a trusted information sharing network.  Amending the
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Homeland Security Act in this regard suggests that the Secretary of Homeland
Security or his designee  from within the Department of Homeland Security, such as
the Chief Information Officer, would be the principal network manager, while
amending Chapter 35 of Title 44, United States Code, suggests the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or his designee would be the principal
manager.  In the latter case, however, it might be possible that the OMB director
would designate the Secretary of Homeland Security or another official within the
Department of Homeland Security, with the Secretary’s concurrence, as his agent for
managing the network.  Whether the OMB director or the Secretary of Homeland
Security is made the principal manager of the network, it would probably be useful,
in terms of accountability, to specify that a “principal officer” shall be designated by
either the OMB director or the Secretary, as the case may be, whose primary
responsibility shall be to carry out the duties of whichever official is tasked as the
principal manager.
Identified below are some possible components for legislation establishing a
policy framework for a trusted information network for information sharing:
purposes, definitions, authority and functions of a principal manager, federal agency
responsibilities, other participants’ responsibilities (which, at this basic stage of
development, are the same as those set out for federal agencies), and annual
inventory and assessment of information sharing initiatives.90  Options regarding the
primary manager are provided, and some other considerations are offered for each of
the proffered components.
While some of the key recommendations of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) report emphasized the
need to improve information sharing practices, the report was, for the most part,
silent regarding how these recommendations might be carried out statutorily.  To that
end, legislation to implement the “trusted information network” called for in the 9/11
Commission report would need to address concerns such as standard-setting
authority, agency responsibilities, and congressional oversight.  The concepts set out
below are possible components of potential information sharing legislation.
Purposes.  
The purposes of this act are the following:
! To facilitate the creation of a “trusted information network.”
! To promote better informed decisionmaking by policy makers.
! To improve the ability of the government to share information
within and among agencies, and among federal, state, and local
government agencies and selected portions of the private sector.
! To promote interoperable information standards.
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! To facilitate a shift from a “need to know” culture of information
protection to a “need to share” culture of integration.
Definitions.
! Director — the term “Director” means the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) [alternatively, the Secretary of
Homeland Security may be inserted].
! Trusted information network — the term “trusted information
network” means a secure, decentralized, scalable, interoperable,
permission-based network, accessible to the appropriate federal,
state, local, and private sector entities, designed to facilitate the
sharing and analysis of information.
! Enterprise architecture — the term “enterprise architecture” means
(A) (i) a strategic information asset base, which defines the mission;
(ii) the information necessary to perform the mission; (iii) the
technologies necessary to perform the mission; and (iv) the
transitional processes for implementing new technologies in
response to changing mission needs; and (B) includes (i) a baseline
architecture; (ii) a target architecture; and (iii) a sequencing plan.
! Relevant agency — the term “relevant agency” means any agency
with responsibility for intelligence and/or homeland security.
Authority and Functions of the OMB Director [or, Alternatively, the
Secretary of Homeland Security].  
The Director [or Secretary of Homeland Security], in coordination with the
Secretary of Homeland Security [or omit in alternative case], the Chief Information
Officer and the Chief Technology Officer of the Department of Homeland Security,
and the designated representatives of the relevant agencies, and in accordance with
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and the E-Government Act of 2002, shall:
! Endeavor to make the information technology systems of the federal
government, including communications systems, effective, efficient,
secure, and appropriately interoperable.
! Oversee and ensure the development and implementation of a
trusted information network for government-wide information
sharing.
! Develop, in conjunction with ongoing federal enterprise architecture
efforts,  a comprehensive enterprise architecture for information
systems, including communications systems, to achieve
interoperability between and among information systems of agencies
with responsibility for homeland security.
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! Develop a plan to achieve interoperability between and among
information systems, including communications systems, of
agencies with responsibility for homeland security and those of state
and local agencies with responsibility for homeland security.
! Establish timetables for the development and implementation of the
trusted information network and associated enterprise architecture.
! Consult with information systems management experts in the public
and private sectors, in the development and implementation of the
trusted information network and associated enterprise architecture.
! Submit, not later than 120 days after the enactment of this act, a
report on efforts to develop and implement the trusted information
network to the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate
and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of
Representatives, with semi-annual reports submitted thereafter.
! Designate, with the approval of the President, a principal officer in
the Office of Management and Budget [or Department of Homeland
Security], whose primary responsibility shall be to carry out the
duties of the Director [or Secretary of Homeland Security] assigned
in this act.
Federal Agency Responsibilities.  
The head of each relevant agency shall: 
! Cooperate fully with the Director [or Secretary of Homeland
Security] in the development of the trusted information network and
associated enterprise architecture to implement government-wide
information sharing, and in the management and acquisition of
information technology consistent with applicable law.
! Develop, document, and implement an agency-wide plan to
participate in the trusted information network in accordance with any
policies or procedures promulgated by the Director [or Secretary of
Homeland Security].
! Report semi-annually to the Director [or Secretary of Homeland
Security] on the progress and effectiveness of efforts to develop and
adopt interoperable information standards, and a scalable enterprise
architecture, and the scope and substance of the information being
shared with other federal, state, and local agencies and selected
portions of the private sector.
! Designate a chief information sharing officer whose primary
responsibility shall be to carry out the agency’s responsibilities
related to this act in coordination with the Director [or Secretary of
Homeland Security].
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Other Participants’ Responsibilities.  
The head of each relevant state and local government agency, other
governmental entity, or private sector organization shall:
! Cooperate fully with the Director [or Secretary of Homeland
Security] in the development of the trusted information network and
associated enterprise architecture to implement government-wide
information sharing, and in the management and acquisition of
information technology consistent with applicable law.
! Develop, document, and implement an agency-wide plan to
participate in the trusted information network in accordance with any
policies or procedures promulgated by the Director [or Secretary of
Homeland Security].
! Report semi-annually to the Director [or Secretary of Homeland
Security] on the progress and effectiveness of efforts to develop and
adopt interoperable information standards, and a scalable enterprise
architecture, and the scope and substance of the information being
shared with other federal, state and local agencies and selected
portions of the private sector.
! Designate a chief information sharing officer whose primary
responsibility shall be to carry out the agency’s responsibilities
related to this act in coordination with the Director [or Secretary of
Homeland Security].
Annual Inventory and Assessment of Information Sharing
Initiatives.
! Each year the Director [or Secretary of Homeland Security] shall
perform an inventory of existing information sharing initiatives
being carried out at the federal, state, and local levels to assess what
information is being shared, with whom it is being shared, resources
being used, the effectiveness of the initiative, and to identify any
overlap or duplication of efforts.
 ! For each initiative documented in the inventory, the inventory shall
include information regarding:  the lead agency/organization in
charge of the initiative, the participant agencies involved in each
initiative, the type(s) of information being shared, the technology
used to facilitate sharing, the capabilities of the sharing system, and
security procedures.
 
! To the extent an information sharing initiative includes classified
activities, details about this initiative will be made available to
Congress only through the appropriate oversight committees of
Congress, in accordance with applicable laws.
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! Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this act, an
initial inventory of information sharing initiatives shall be prepared
by the Director [or Secretary of Homeland Security] and submitted
to the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives,
with annual reports submitted thereafter.
Related Proposed Legislation
Among the information sharing proposals offered during the 108th Congress, S.
2701, the Homeland Security Interagency and Interjurisdictional Information Sharing
Act of 2004, was introduced by Senator Joseph Lieberman with bipartisan support
on July 21, 2004.91  Referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs, the
legislation would have established a Homeland Security Information Sharing
Network to facilitate information flow within and among federal, state, local, and
tribal government agencies; established a Homeland Security Information
Coordinating Council to develop and oversee protocols and procedures for sharing
homeland security information; directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to create
a performance management plan and an incentive program to assess and promote
information sharing objectives; and established an Office of Information Sharing
(OIS) within the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness at DHS.  OIS, among other responsibilities, would have been tasked
with facilitating information sharing among federal, state, and local government
agencies through the creation of regional task forces and the establishment of 24-hour
operations centers in each state; fostering the development of interoperable
communications systems for state and local agencies; providing technical assistance
to state and local agencies in the development of regional information sharing
networks; and administering a preparedness grant program to support state and local
agency information sharing activities.  No action was taken on the bill prior to the
final adjournment of the 108th Congress.
Senator Lieberman also introduced S. 2708, the National Strategy for Homeland
Security Act of 2004, on July 21, 2004.92  Referred to the Committee on
Governmental Affairs as well, the measure directed the Secretary of Homeland
Security, “in collaboration with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
and the Homeland Security Council,” to “develop the National Strategy for
Homeland Security for the detection, prevention, protection, response, and recovery
with regard to terrorist threats to the United States.”  This mandated national strategy
would have been an updated version of the one issued in July 2002, and would itself
have been rewritten every fours years, with updates every two years and annual
progress reports to be submitted with the President’s annual budget request.  With
respect to information sharing, Section 3(c)(2)(a) of S. 2708 would have had the
National Strategy for Homeland Security include “policies and procedures to
maximize the collection, translation, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of
information relating to combating terrorism and the homeland security response
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throughout the Federal government, and with State and local authorities, and, as
appropriate, the private sector.”  The bill remained in committee at the conclusion of
the 108th Congress.
Several legislative proposals were introduced in the 108th Congress to
implement the many recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, which issued its
final report on July 22, 2004.  The Bush Administration, on September 16,  sent to
congressional leaders its draft bill, which would have established a National
Intelligence Director (NID), who, among other responsibilities, would have
established common security and access standards for managing and handling
intelligence systems, information, and products, including access to collected data
and analytic products generated by or within the intelligence community, focusing
particularly on facilitating among the agencies and organizations within the
intelligence community and networks available across the other federal agencies
involved in national security and homeland security activities, state and local
governments, and, as appropriate, other entities, the fullest and most prompt sharing
of and access to information and products practicable, including access to collected
data and analytic products, with special emphasis on detecting, preventing,
preempting, and disrupting terrorist threats and attacks against the U.S., its people,
property, and interest.  In doing so, the director also would have been tasked with the
establishment of interface standards for an interoperable information-sharing
enterprise that facilitated automated access to national intelligence by agencies and
organizations within the intelligence community.
Selected by the Senate majority and minority leaders to lead the effort to
legislatively implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, Senator
Susan Collins, the chair of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, and Senator
Lieberman, the ranking minority member on the panel, initially discussed the general
terms of their reform bill at a September 15 press conference.93  The text of the
legislation was made public in draft form on September 20.  The Committee on
Governmental Affairs began a markup of the Collins proposal on September 21, and
completed their action the following day when the committee ordered the amended
measure favorably reported as an original bill.  Introduced by Senator Collins as an
original bill on September 23, the legislation was designated S. 2840, the National
Intelligence Reform Act.94  The proposal was also introduced a second time that day,
with Senator Lieberman as a cosponsor, and was designated  S. 2845.  At the end of
the day, unanimous-consent agreement was reached providing that, on September 27,
the Senate would begin consideration of S. 2845.  As introduced, S. 2845 would have
made the NID responsible for intelligence dissemination and sharing, including using
an integrated communications network that provides interoperable communications
capabilities among all elements of the intelligence community and other appropriate
entities; directed the President to establish a trusted information network to facilitate
collaboration and information sharing among federal, state, local, and tribal
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government agencies; established an Advisory Council on Information Sharing to
advise the President and relevant agency officials on issues related to the
establishment and ongoing operation of the information sharing network; required
the President to submit semiannual reports to Congress regarding the state of the
information sharing network; required participant agencies to submit annual reports
to OMB regarding their use and expenditures related to the information sharing
network; and required GAO to assess periodically the implementation and operation
of the information sharing network.  The Senate began consideration of S. 2845 on
September 27 and completed action on October 6 with a 96-2 vote of approval of the
legislation as amended.
In the House, the vehicle for implementing the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission was introduced by Speaker Dennis Hastert on September 24, and was
designated H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act.  The bill drew
upon the President’s September 16 draft proposal, with additional input from
committee chairs who had held hearings on the findings and recommendations of the
9/11 Commission during August and the early weeks of September.  As a result, the
bill contained various provisions not found in S. 2845, as introduced.  Provisions of
H.R. 10, as introduced, would have vested the NID with authority to ensure
maximum availability of, and access to, intelligence information within the
intelligence community, consistent with national security requirements; authorized
additional appropriations for information systems for sharing data concerning money
laundering and terrorist financing; fostered improved information sharing and
dissemination by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; directed the NID to establish
an interim, interoperable intelligence data exchange system that would have
connected the data systems operated independently by the entities in the intelligence
community and by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to permit
automated data exchange among these entities, and also to establish a fully
functional, interoperable law enforcement and intelligence electronic data system —
to be known as the “Chimera system” — within the NCTC to provide immediate
access to information in databases of federal law enforcement agencies and the
intelligence community that is necessary to identify terrorists, and organizations and
individuals that support terrorism; and mandated the Secretary of Homeland Security
to establish a mechanism to ensure the coordination and dissemination of terrorist
travel intelligence and operational information among appropriate agencies.  The
House bill was referred to the Committees on Armed Services, Education and the
Workforce, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Government Reform,
International Relations, the Judiciary, Rules, Science, Transportation and
Infrastructure, and Ways and Means, as well as the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Select Committee on Homeland Security.  Committee markups
were scheduled to begin on September 29.  On October 7, the Committee on Rules
reported a version of the legislation for floor discussion and made 23 amendments
in order for consideration.95  The House completed its action on the legislation on
October 8 when it approved the modified bill on a 282-134 vote.
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Conference committee deliberations on the reform bills began on October 20,
but became prolonged due to considerable differences between them.  Agreement on
a November 20 compromise version of the legislation quickly unraveled in the
House.  Subsequently, another compromise version was realized, and the conferees
filed their report on this legislation on December 7.96  That day, the House, on a 336-
75 vote, approved the conference committee report, and the Senate accepted it the
following day on a 89-2 vote.  President George W. Bush signed the bill into law on
December 17.97 The reform legislation established a National Intelligence Director
(NID), appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, to serve as the principal
intelligence adviser to the President, head the intelligence community, and oversee
and direct the National Intelligence Program.  Other new components included a
National Counterterrorism Center, within the office of the NID, to serve as the
primary executive branch organization for counterterrorism intelligence and strategic
operational planning.  In addition, the President was authorized to establish a
National Counter Proliferation Center to prevent and halt the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and
technologies; and the NID was authorized to establish one or more national
intelligence centers to address intelligence priorities, including regional issues.  A
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, composed of five members appointed
by, and serving at the pleasure of, the President, was also created and located within
the Executive Office of the President.
With regard to information sharing, Section 1016 of the reform legislation
directed the President to create an information sharing environment (ISE) for the
sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national security and
applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.  The President was
also authorized to designate the organizational and management structures that will
be used to operate and manage the ISE.  By March 17, 2005, the President must
designate, with notification to Congress, a program manager “responsible for
information sharing across the Federal Government.”  The duties and responsibilities
of this individual are specified in the statute, including the obligation, by mid-April,
to submit to the President and Congress a report describing “the technological, legal,
and policy issues presented by the creation of the ISE, and the way in which these
issues will be addressed.”  An Information Sharing Council was also created,
utilizing the Information Systems Council established by E.O. 13356 of August 27,
2004.98  Finally, by December 17, 2006, and annually thereafter, the President is
required to submit to Congress a report on the state of the ISE and information
sharing across the federal government.  Elsewhere, Section 6501 amended Rule 6(e)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to facilitate somewhat sharing of grand
jury information.
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Appendix 1. Selected Online 
Information Sharing Resources
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov)
[http://www.llis.gov]
Information Sharing and Analysis Center Council (ISAC Council)
[http://www.isaccouncil.org/]
Multi-State Information Sharing Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
[http://www.cscic.state.ny.us/msisac/index.html]
Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center (WaterISAC)
[http://www.waterisac.org/]
Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC)
[http://www.fsisac.com/]
Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC)
[https://www.it-isac.org/index.php]
Energy Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ENERGY-ISAC)
[http://www.energyisac.com/index.cfm]
Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ESISAC)
[http://www.esisac.com]
Chemical Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
[http://chemicalisac.chemtrec.com]
Healthcare Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (HCISAC)
[http://www.hcisac.org]
Highway Information Sharing and Analysis Center
[http://www.truckline.com/insideata/isac/]
Surface Transportation and Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (ST-ISAC)
[http://www.surfacetransportationisac.org/]
National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (NCC-ISAC)
[http://www.ncs.gov/ncc/main.html]
